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CHAPTER 8 
Corporations 
JAMES W. SMITH 
§8.1. Derivative suit: Necessity of demand upon the shareholders. 
In the 1950 decision S. Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc. v. New England 
Theatres Operating Corp.,l the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
held that a vote by a majority of the stockholders of a corporation, 
undominated and uncontrolled, acting reasonably and in good faith, 
could bar the bringing of a derivative suit by the minority share-
holders, regardless of the nature of the cause of action.2 The rationale 
of this holding was that from a business viewpoint it is not always best 
to insist upon all one's legal rights and since honest and intelligent 
men may differ as to business policy the will of the majority, acting 
fairly, should control. The question of the scope of the holding in 
the Solo mont case has presented more problems for the federal court 
than it has for the Massachusetts state courts. 
In the 1951 decision of the Federal District Court, Pomerantz v. 
Clark,3 Judge Wyzanski, construing the Solomont case, held that Mas-
sachusetts law required that a minority shareholder, wishing to bring 
a shareholders' derivative suit, must appeal to the corporate directors, 
or, if they are disqualified, to the corporate shareholders, to decide not 
only if the particular claim has merit but also if the corporate welfare 
is best promoted by suing upon it. Furthermore, the fact that the 
shareholders of the corporation were numerous and scattered through-
out the country and that few attended meetings or even signed proxies, 
did not excuse the demand requirement.4 The Pomerantz decision 
seemed like a logical extension of the Solomont decision. If a majority 
of the stockholders, not under the control of the wrongdoers, could 
bar a shareholders' derivative suit for business reasons, why would 
not a minority stockholder, wishing to embark the corporation into 
litigation, be first required to obtain the concurrence of a majority of 
JAMES W. SMITH is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School and a member 
of the Massachusetts Bar. He is coauthor of Smith and Cavitch, Massachusetts Cor-
poration Law (1963). 
§8.I. 1326 Mass. 99, 93 N.E.2d 241 (1950). 
2 It is sometimes held in other jurisdictions that an application to the shareholders 
is necessary in the case of voidable transactions but unnecessary in the case of 
fraudulent transactions on the basis that a majority of the shareholders cannot ratify 
fraudulent conduct. See Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 
138 (1912). 
3101 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 1951). 
4 The company involved in the Pomerantz case was John Hancock Mutual Life 
Insurance Company with millions of policyholders. 
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the owners of the corporation? Ultimately they will be required to bear 
the expenses of litigation and will be affected by its outcome. 
The first crack in the holding of the Pomerantz case appeared in 
the 1962 decision of the United States Court of Appeals, Halprin v. 
Babbitt,r, In the Halprin case, the basic question was whether a minor-
ity shareholder could maintain a derivative suit when the majority, 
after being notified of the cause of action, failed to act. In other words, 
does Massachusetts law require express authorization by the majority 
for the maintaining of the suit before the minority shareholder can 
proceed? In answering this question in the negative the Court stated: 
We believe that the form should be a demand that the majority 
cause proceedings to be instituted and that the purposes are two. 
The first is to permit the majority to take some sort of affirma-
tive action itself. The second is to permit the majority to decide, 
as in Solomont, that no action be taken by anybody. But if the 
majority does neither, we do not think that the minority is 
powerless to proceed merely because, to quote the district court, 
it failed to obtain "express authorization from the majority."6 
In a 1964 decision of the United States Court of Appeals, Levitt v. 
johnson,7 the court went out of its way, with very strong dicta, to 
further debilitate the holding in the Pomerantz case. In the Levitt 
case the court took the position that the Solomont case did not require 
that in all instances a minority shareholder must appeal to the ma jor-
ity for action prior to bringing a derivative suit. In its opinion the 
court stated: 
The fact that a majority of informed disinterested stockholders 
might decide, for reasons discussed in Solomont, that a suit should 
not be prosecuted, does not mean that they must be fully in-
structed in every instance before the suit is instituted. As we 
pointed out in Halprin v. Babbitt . . . the minority does not 
have to obtain the express authorization of the majority before 
suit is commenced. The demand upon the majority, in other 
words, does not have this broad purpose. Neither of the limited 
purposes we outlined in Halprin could be accomplished in any 
real sense unless the demand evoked a full and fair consideration 
of the issues, in depth, by the other stockholders. If their number 
is small, as in Halprin, and the minority could reasonably be 
expected to put its case before them, it should be obliged to do 
so. However, on the allegations of the present complaint not only 
would such a burden be enormous, but no disclosure that plain-
tiff could be expected to make would be likely to persuade a 
majority to take over the action, or, conversely, permit an in-
formed decision by the majority that the action be not instituted.8 
I) 303 F.2d 13S (1st Cir. 1962). 
6Id. at HI. 
7334 F.2d S15 (1st Cir. 1964), rev'g 222 F. Supp. S05 (D. Mass. 1963). 
8Id. at SIS. 
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If the dicta in the Levitt case may be considered to constitute a 
reliable prediction, the interpretation of the Solomont case in the 
federal court is now as follows: If the majority shareholders are so 
numerous and scattered that they could not practically, as a body, 
make a decision whether to bring the suit or refrain from bringing 
the suit, Solomont does not require an appeal to them as a condition 
precedent to bringing the suit. If the group is sufficiently small that an 
appeal must be made and is made, and no decision by the majority 
is forthcoming, the minority shareholder may proceed with the action. 
§8.2. Derivative suit: Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides in part: 
The complaint shall also set forth with particularity the efforts of 
the plaintiff to secure from the managing directors or trustees and, 
if necessary, from the shareholders such action as he desires, and 
the reasons for his failure to obtain such action or the reasons for 
not making such effort. [Emphasis supplied.] 
Rule 23(b) had its origin in the United States Supreme Court 
decision, Hawes v. Oakland. 1 The Hawes case established the principle 
that a minority shareholder wishing to sue on behalf of his corpora-
tion in a federal court must first exhaust his available remedies within 
the corporation. 
He must make an earnest, not a simulated effort, with the manag-
ing body of the corporation, to induce remedial action on their 
part, and this must be made apparent to the court. If time permits 
or has permitted, he must show, if he fails with the directors, that 
he has made an honest effort to obtain action by the shareholders 
as a body, in the matter of which he complains. And he must 
show a case, if this is not done, where it could not be done, or 
it was not reasonable to require it.2 [Emphasis supplied.] 
Following Erie R.R. v. Tompkins3 the question has arisen concern-
ing the extent that Rule 23(b) is affected by particular state law. Since 
all states, absent evidence of futility, require a demand upon the 
corporate directors as a condition precedent to the bringing of a 
derivative suit, this aspect of Rule 23(b) creates little problem. Since, 
however, the states are split on the question of when a minority share-
holder must make a demand upon the majority shareholders as a 
condition precedent to bringing the suit, the question posed is whether 
Rule 23(b) creates at least a minimum requirement for demand upon 
the shareholders in cases brought in the federal courts, or whether 
the "if necessary" phrase of Rule 23(b) incorporates state law. The 
cases dealing with the question have been far from harmonious.4 
§8.2. 1104 U.S. 450, 26 L. Ed. 827 (1881). 
2Id. at 461, 26 L. Ed. at 832. 
3304 U.S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 877, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938). . 
4 While the phrase "if necessary" has been interpreted by a few courts as incor-
3
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While the particular point has not been a focal point of any decision 
of the United States District Court in Massachusetts or the United 
States Court of Appeals of the First Circuit, the language of Judge 
Wyzanski in the recent case of Levitt v. Johnson5 indicates that he 
would view Rule 23(b) as establishing a federal demand requirement 
apart from state law. After listing the reasons set forth by the plaintiff 
for his failure to make a demand upon the shareholders, Judge 
Wyzanski stated: 
The complaint complies with Fed. Civ. Proc. Rule 23(b). It 
meets the procedural obligation to set forth with particularity the 
reasons for plaintiff not making an effort to obtain action from 
the shareholders. . . . 
The problem is whether plaintiff, in addition to fulfilling the 
procedural requirements of the aforesaid Rule 23(b), has also 
fulfilled, in the terminology of Hausman v. Buckley, 2nd Cir. 
299 F.2d 696, 701, the "substantive" conditions precedent with 
respect to the obligations, if any, of a shareholder, in a deriva-
tive action, to make a demand upon his fellow shareholders. 
[Emphasis supplied.]6 
The position of Judge Wyzanski on this matter as expressed in 
the Levitt case would seem to be the correct one. The most logical 
interpretation of the phrase "if necessary" is that when a demand 
upon the directors would be obviously futile or when a demand upon 
the directors has been made and they have refused to act, exhaustion 
of administrative remedies within the corporation would then make 
necessary a demand upon the shareholders. If valid reasons exist for 
not making such a demand, or if such a demand has been made and 
no action has been taken by the shareholders, these matters must be 
set out in the complaint with particularity. 
Such an interpretation has not only a logical basis but an historical 
basis as well,7 
porating state law (Tobelman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 41 F. Supp. 334 
(D. Del. 1941), and Steinberg v. Hardy, 90 F. Supp. 167 (D. Conn. 1950», "most 
federal cases have given wider sweep to the rule and have required application to 
the general body of stockholders even in situations where nonratifiable fraudulent 
actions have been involved. They point to the possibility of stockholder action other 
than ratification, such as the election of new directors, and assert flatly that a stock-
holder'S derivative action should not be entertained except where recourse to both 
directors and stockholders has either been exhausted or excused. See Stone v. Holly 
Hill Fruit Products, 56 F.2d 553, 554 (5th Cir. 1932); Abraham v. Parkins, 36 F. Supp. 
238, 240 (D.C. [W.D.] Pa. 1940); Varanelli v. Wood, 9 F.R.D. 61, 12 F.R. Servo 328 
(D.C; [S.D.] N.Y. 1948) .... " Escoett v. Aldecress Country Club, 16 N.]. 438,447, 109 
A.2d 277, 281-282 (1954). 
5222 F. Supp. 805 (D. Mass. 1963). 
6Id. at 808. While the case of Levitt v. Johnson was reversed on appeal, 334 F.2d 
815 (1st Cir. 1964), the reversal was upon other grounds. (See §8.3 infra.) 
7 "First, since the rule is the origin of the demand requirement, it seems unlikely 
that its authors contemplated existing state-made excuses. Second, because the Rule 
of Decisions Act, Rev. Stat. §721 (1875), did not apply to courts of equity, the 
4
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§8.3. Derivative suit: Law governing shareholder demand where 
action brought under federal statute. In the case of Levitt v. John-
son1 the plaintiff, a minority shareholder in a Massachusetts corpora-
tion, brought a derivative suit in the United States District Court for 
Massachusetts complaining that the directors and others injured the 
corporation by violations of the Federal Investment Company Act of 
1940.2 The United States District Court granted the defendant's 
motibn to dismiss the complaint on the basis that the defendant, while 
fulfilling the procedural requirements of Rule 23(b) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure,s had failed to comply with the requirements 
of Massachusetts law that a demand be made upon the shareholders 
of the corporation. In so holding Judge Wyzanski stated: 
Reference to the law of the state of incorporation to determine 
whether a stockholder has the substantive right to bring a deriva-
tive action for his corporation remains appropriate even if the 
claim which the corporation has against the alleged wrongdoer 
is based on a federal statute. It is that principle which explains 
the opinion of Justice Brandeis in United Copper Securities Co. 
v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 264, 37 S. Ct. 509, 
510-511,61 L. Ed. 1119 [1124-1125 (1917)] that "The fact that the 
cause of action is based on the Sherman Law does not limit the 
discretion of the directors or the power of the body of stock-
holders; nor does it give to individual shareholders the right to 
interfere with the internal management of the corporation."4 
In vacating the judgment of the district court and remanding the 
action for further proceedings, Judge Aldrich of the United States 
Court of Appeals stated that the position of the district court "negates 
the intendment of the act and underestimates the role to be played 
by the federal courts in the implementation of national regulatory 
legislation."5 In distinguishing in a footnote the United Copper Securi-
ties case, the court stated: 
On the one hand, the policy of the antitrust laws is the preserva-
tion and protection of competition in our economy in its broadest 
Supreme Court's rule-making power, see Act of August 23, IS42, §6, 5 Stat. 518, 
combined with the federal courts' autonomy in making substantive law under the 
prevailing influence of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) would have made 
application of state law, even if it had existed at the time Equity Rule 94 was 
adopted, unnecessary. Finally, the Hawes opinion itself [referring to the case of 
Hawes v. Oakland, note 1 supra, the case creating the demand requirement] suggests 
federal criteria consonant with equitable notions of fair procedure for excusing 
demand on the shareholders and these criteria give content to the phrase 'if neces-
sary: 104 U.S. 450, 460-461 (ISSl):' Note, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 10S6, 1090 n_36 (1963). 
§S.3. 1222 F. Supp. S05 (D. Mass. 1963). 
215 U.S.C. §SOa-l et seq. (1964). 
S For a discussion of the operation of Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, see §S.2 supra. 
4222 F. Supp. S05, SOS (D. Mass. 1963). 
I> Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d S15, S19 (1st Cir. 1964). 
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scope. Those laws are· thus geared to the protection of competing 
businesses, as businesses, whether in the corporate form or not. 
On the other hand, the policy of the Investment Company Act is 
to provide a comprehensive network of restrictions upon the 
organization, operation and management of investment companies 
to the end that the individual investors might be protected.6 
It is difficult to say how seriously this footnote distinction should be 
taken. The court is not clear whether it would apply the holding of 
the United Copper Securities case (and hence Massachusetts law on 
demand requirements) if a derivative suit arises under an antitrust act. 
While it is realistic today to ignore the corporate entity for some 
purposes when dealing with "incorporated partnerships," the distinc-
tion set out in the footnote in the Levitt case goes too far in ignoring 
the corporate entity in a public issue corporation. Obviously Congress 
may expressly create the right in a shareholder to maintain an action 
on behalf of his corporation for a federally created wrong.7 No doubt 
such an intent might even be implied when the predominant purpose 
of the legislation is to protect a shareholder interest rather than a 
corporate interest as such. In such event there ought not to be any 
demand requirement, state or federa1.8 When, however, the right 
created can be enforced only by the corporation, either directly or by 
virtue of a derivative suit, whether compliance with Rule 23(b) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will be sufficient should not 
depend upon reading into the statute some overriding concern by 
Congress for the individual shareholder. 
§8.4. Inspection of stockholder lists: Interpretation of statutory 
language. General Laws, Chapter 155, Section 22, provides in part 
as follows: 
The stock and transfer books of every corporation, which shall 
contain a complete list of all stockholders, their residences and 
the amount of stock held by each, shall be kept at an office of 
the corporation in the commonwealth for the inspection of its 
stockholders .... If any officer or agent of a corporation having 
charge of such ... books ... refuses or neglects to exhibit them or 
to submit them to examination as aforesaid, he or the corporation 
shall be liable to any stockholder for all actual damages sustained 
by reason of such refusal or neglect, and the supreme judicial or 
6Id. at 820 n.5. The court quoted this statement from the S.E.C. brief, filed as 
amicus curiae in this case. 
7 See, for example, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §16(b), 15 V.S.C. §78p(b) 
(1964), providing for the recovery for the benefit of a corporation of so· called "short 
swing profits" realized by an "insider" upon dealing in its stock. 
8 See, for example, Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1954), wherein 
the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit held that the contemporaneous owner· 
ship of stock requirement of Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
was inapplicable when the federal act (Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §16(b), 15 
V.S.C. §78p(b) (1964» itself provided that the suit could be brought for the benefit 
of the corporation "by the owner of any security." 
6
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superior court shall have jurisdiction in equity, upon petition 
of a stockholder, to order ... said ... books ... to be exhibited 
to him ... , but in an action for damages or a proceeding in equity 
under this section for neglect or refusal to exhibit for inspection 
the stock and transfer books, it shall be a defense that the actual 
purpose and reason for the inspection sought are to secure a list 
of stockholders for the purpose of selling said list or copies 
thereof or of using the same for a purpose other than in the 
interest of the applicant, as a stockholder, relative to the affairs 
of the corporation. [Emphasis supplied.]! 
Prior to 1923 the statutory right of a stockholder to examine stock-
holder lists was absolute.2 By Acts of 1923, Chapter 172, the corpora-
tion was permitted to set up a shareholder's improper purpose as a 
defense to an application for inspection.s Hence, in this respect, the 
cases decided prior to 1923 dealing with the statutory right of inspec-
tion of the stock and transfer books were rendered obsolete.4 Since the 
1923 amendment two cases have been decided by the Supreme Judicial 
Court interpreting the limiting language of the statute, Hanrahan v. 
Puget Sound Power &- Light CO.5 and the 1964 decision Donaldson v. 
Boston Herald-Traveler Corp.6 
The situation in the Hanrahan case involved a possible merger 
battle. The stockholders seeking inspection planned to solicit proxies 
on behalf of a pro-private merger committee of whose members only 
one fourth were stockholders, the other members being in the invest-
ment banking or securities business. In holding that the corporation 
had not sustained its burden of proof that the purpose of the inspec-
tion was improper, the Court stated: 
With the business merits of such a merger we are not concerned; 
that is a question for the stockholders to determine. All that we 
are concerned with is whether this objective is such a purpose as to 
fall outside the plaintiffs' interest "as a stockholder relative to 
§8.4. 1 The quoted provision has been unchanged by the new Massachusetts Busi-
ness Corporation Law (G.L., c. 156B, §32) except that the new act substitutes the 
word "records" for "books" (in accord with modern techniques of electronic record-
keeping), and provides that the stock and transfer records shall be kept in the 
Commonwealth at the corporation'S principal office or at an office of its transfer 
agent or of its clerk or of its resident agent. 
2 Shea v. Parker, 234 Mass. 592, 126 N.E. 47 (1920). 
S It was probably because of the result in the case of Shea v. Parker, note 2 supra, 
that Acts of 1923, c. 172, was enacted. The Shea case interpreted the earlier statute as 
allowing inspection of stockholder lists for any purpose. The information sought in 
the Shea case was for the plaintiff's use as a stockbroker. Hence the language of the 
statute, " ... other than in the interest of the applicant, as a stockholder, relative to 
the affairs of the corporation," is appropriate. 
4 The cases interpreting the shareholder's common law right to inspect the cor-
poration's books and records (see for example, Varney v. Baker, 194 Mass. 239, 80 
N.E. 524 (1907» were obviously unaffected by Acts of 1923, c. 172. See Gavin v. Purdy, 
335 Mass. 236, 139 N.E.2d 397 (1957), noted in 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.2. 
5332 Mass. 586, 126 N.E.2d 499 (1955). 
6347 Mass. 274, 197 N.E.2d 671 (1964). 
7
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the affairs of the corporation." Plainly a change in the manage-
ment and the policy of the corporation affects the plaintiffs' 
rights as stockholders and is certainly relative to the affairs of 
the corporation .... There is no evidence that they intend to use 
the list for commercial purposes such as the solicitation of stock-
holders for the purchase of other securities.7 
The Court thus made it clear that the question of whether the de-
manding shareholder's purpose will ultimately be beneficial or detri-
mental to the corporation is not relevant on the issue of proper pur-
pose under the statute. What is relevant is that his purpose is germane 
to his position as a stockholder in the corporation. This point was 
underscored by the Supreme Judicial Court in the 1964 Donaldson 
case in the following language: 
That the plaintiff had no suggestion for improvement in the man-
ner in which the newspaper was being run, or did not wish to talk 
to the president, or wanted the president's job ... , or described his 
own motives as purely selfish does not render his purpose im-
proper. The solicitation of proxies in order to try to change man-
agement is a proper purpose.s 
A second issue raised in the Donaldson case was whether attorney's 
fees could be recovered under the term "all actual damages," used in 
General Laws, Chapter 155, Section 22. On this point the Supreme 
Judicial Court sustained the position of the trial court that damages 
recoverable under the statute did not include attorney's fees. This 
position is consistent with the general rule in Massachusetts that no 
recovery may be had for counsel fees in the very action to redress a 
plaintiff's wrong as distinguished from other counsel fees which the 
plaintiff has been compelled to pay.9 The Court held that the legisla-
ture must be taken to have been aware of this principle and had it 
intended the statute to embrace attorney's fees it would have spe-
cifically so stated. 
The third issue. raised in the Donaldson case was whether applica-
tion to the transfer agent to inspect the corporation's stockholder list 
was, under General Laws, Chapter 155, Section 22, an effectual ap-
plication.1o On this point the Court held that the transfer agent fell 
within the description of an "agent" having charge of such "books and 
records" under General Laws, Chapter 155, Section 22. While such a 
position creates little difficulty when the action brought by the plain-
tiff is merely to compel the corporation to exhibit the stockholder lists 
it is doubtful that, for purposes of recovering damages under General 
7l1l12 Mass. 586, 592-59l1, 126 N.E.2d 499, 50ll-504 (1955). 
sll47 Mass. 274, 280, 197 N.E.2d 671, 676 (1964). 
9 Goldberg v. Curhan, lIlI2 Mass. lIIO, lI12, 124 N.E.2d 926, 927 (1955). See, how-
ever, Malloy v. Carroll, 287 Mass. lI76, 191 N.E. 661 (19l14), wherein counsel fees in 
the very case were ordered paid by the defendants. The case was a suit in equity by 
plaintiffs to obtain reinstatement in a labor union and the Court described the 
circumstances as exceptional. 
10 This question was left open in the Hanrahan case, lIlI2 Mass. 586, 590 n.l, 126 
N.E.2d 499, 502 n.l (1955). 
8
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Laws, Chapter 155, Section 22, a transfer agent should be treated as 
such an agent of the corporation that notice to it of a demand would 
constitute notice to the corporation. The mere fact of physical custody 
of the stockholder list by the transfer agent should not so clothe it with 
authority to either comply or refuse to comply with the shareholder's 
demand. 
§8.5. Directors' liability: Watered stock. The danger inherent in 
the use of par value stock in a small business corporation was again 
demonstrated in the 1964 decision Bay State York Co. v. Cobb.1 In 
this case the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decree of the trial 
court imposing liability upon the directors, the sole stockholders, of 
a small business corporation,2 to the extent of a debt owed to a creditor 
by the corporation, for issuing par value stock to themselves for less 
than the total amount of the par value.s 
It makes little sense today for organizers of a small business corpora-
tion to create potential personal liability by committing themselves 
initially to pay for a high total amount of par value stock. Where 
property is to be used as the consideration for the stock, no par stock 
prevents the organizers from having to commit themselves to a par-
ticular valuation for the property at the time that the articles of or-
ganization are being prepared.4 If cash is the consideration it is usually 
preferable to use no par stock; if however par value stock is to be used, 
wisdom would generally dictate that the organizers issue only stock 
having a total par value equal to the amount of cash then to be paid 
rather than committing themselves to installments. If subsequently 
they wish to invest more money in the corporation they may then issue 
more stock. 
If the defendants in the Bay State York Co. case had originally issued 
stock having a total par value equal to the cash they were then in-
vesting in the corporation they would not have incurred personal lia-
bility. They might later have purchased more stock for cash or property 
if they so desired. Their mistake was committing themselves initially 
to a large cash payment (all of which they did not pay) by issuing a 
large total amount of par value stock. 
§8.5. 1346 Mass. 641, 195 N.E.2d 328 (1964). 
2 G.L., c. 156, §36, imposes joint liability upon the directors of a corporation for 
issuing stock in violation of G.L., c. 156, §15. The comparable provision under G.L., 
c. 156B, is Section 60. 
S G.L., c. 156, §15, provides that par value stock may not be issued for less than 
par. The comparable provision under G.L., c. 156B, is Section 18. 
While the stock in the Bay State York Co. case was purportedly issued for cash 
the defendants attempted to show that the corporation received an amount equal to 
total par value on the basis that the defendants, subsequent to incorporation, trans-
ferred an alcoholic beverage license to the corporation. Without deciding whether 
such a license would constitute an exchange of property for stock, the Court held 
that it could not be used to correct the initial underpayment because of noncom-
pliance with G.L., c. 156, §IO(c), which requires that the articles of organization 
describe in detail property which is received for stock. Since the stock was authorized 
only for cash, the license would not suffice. 
4 Such property will later have to be valued for purposes of filing the statement 
of the condition of the corporation. See G.L., c. 156B, §109. For a discussion of this 
matter see Smith Be Cavitch, Massachusetts Corporation Law §2.13[2][c][i] (1963). 
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